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 There are many ways to think about the nature of business 
corporations.  They can be seen as mere aggregations of natural 
persons or as entities in their own right.  As entities, they have been 
described as either natural or artificial,1 and the idea of the 
corporation as a person is itself fraught with ambiguity.2  This 
Article focuses on two perspectives and traces their respective 
implications for notions of corporate social responsibility (“CSR”).  
One is familiar and has impeded efforts to argue that corporations 
should be managed with attention to their obligations to society.  
The other, less familiar perspective draws on the concept of 
sustainability and offers potentially more promising prospects for 
those concerned about CSR. 
The first perspective regarding the nature of the corporation is 
structural.  Its focus is on the corporation’s constituent elements.  
These elements include senior management, shareholders, 
employees, creditors, consumers, and communities in which the 
corporation operates.  Each of these constituencies has its own 
interests and these interests often conflict with those of other 
constituencies.  For example, shareholders’ desire for profit may be 
at odds with workers’ desire for high wages.  The primary normative 
question presented by this vision of the corporation is the amount of 
weight that should be given to the interests of each of these 
constituencies.  In a particular case of conflict, whose interests 
should take priority? 
The second approach is temporal.  The focus is on the 
 
  J.B. Stombock Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University.  An 
earlier version of this Article was presented at the symposium on “The 
Sustainable Corporation” held at Wake Forest University School of Law in April 
2011.  The author is grateful to the symposium participants for their many 
helpful comments. 
 1. See generally David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 
201. 
 2. See David Millon, The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate 
Personhood, 2 STAN. AGORA: ONLINE J. LEGAL PERSP. 39 (2001); David 
Millon, Personifying the Corporate Body, 2 GRAVEN IMAGES: J. CULTURE, L. 
SACRED 116, 116 (1995). 
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corporation as an entity existing in time.  Rather than an 
aggregation of numerous constituencies, the corporation is itself a 
distinct person.  The primary emphasis then is on the various 
external relationships that determine its long-term survival.  Here 
the key question is how the corporation should interact with its 
various stakeholders in order to ensure its long-run viability. 
The structural approach ignores this temporal dimension and 
instead attends to the immediate impact of particular choices to 
favor the interests of one constituency over those of others.  This 
assessment is typically made without reference to possible long-term 
considerations.  So, for example, the possibility of economic benefits 
to the corporation accruing in the future will not necessarily justify 
expenditures that reduce profits in the short term. 
These different ways of thinking about the corporation support 
two different ways of thinking about CSR.  The first speaks in 
structural terms, emphasizing the broad range of interests that the 
corporation’s management should take into account.  The main 
challenge is balancing potentially conflicting interests implicated by 
particular business decisions.  In particular, CSR under this view 
requires that management be willing to subordinate the 
shareholders’ desire for profit maximization to the claims of 
nonshareholder stakeholders.  Because it conceives of CSR in terms 
of the conflicting interests of shareholder and nonshareholder 
constituencies, this view might be referred to as the “constituency” 
model of CSR. 
The second model is temporal in focus, with the key question 
being the corporation’s success over the long run.  Long-run 
sustainability depends crucially on the viability of the various 
stakeholders that determine the corporation’s success.  These 
include workers, suppliers, and customers, as well as investors, and 
even the environment.3  Decisions of corporate management often 
affect the well-being of these stakeholders in positive or negative 
ways.  Further, management has the ability to improve 
stakeholders’ well-being through investment of corporate funds.  If 
the corporation’s long-run sustainability is a serious objective, 
management must cultivate and nurture these relationships.  My 
main point in this Article is that a long-run orientation to corporate 
management will achieve many of the objectives favored by CSR 
advocates.  This model might therefore be referred to as the 
“sustainability” model of CSR.  Because the corporation must earn 
profits in order to survive, the interests of shareholders and 
nonshareholders do not unavoidably conflict with each other under 
this model.  For this reason, this way of thinking about CSR can 
 
 3. For a discussion of the concept of the environment as a stakeholder, see 
generally Robert A. Phillips & Joel Reichart, The Environment as a 
Stakeholder? A Fairness-Based Approach, 23  J. BUS. ETHICS 185 (2000). 
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overcome the primary conceptual and political obstacle to the 
constituency model, which is the assumption that shareholder 
interests should predominate over those of nonshareholders. 
This Article first considers the constituency model of CSR, 
which is the more familiar way of thinking about these issues.  I 
discuss its status in law and practice.  I then turn to the 
sustainability model, which offers a new and potentially fruitful 
perspective on CSR, and provide illustrations to highlight its 
contrast with the constituency model.  I close with some thoughts on 
the prospects for a sustainability approach to CSR. 
I.  THE CONSTITUENCY MODEL OF CSR 
A. The Model 
The constituency model of CSR sees the corporation as an 
organization consisting of a number of different groups of people, in 
which the members of each group share more or less common 
interests.  Shareholders, for example, generally seek maximal 
return on their investments.  Employees want rewarding work, 
satisfactory working conditions, and good wages.  Creditors expect 
that they will be paid according to the terms of their contracts.  
Often, conflicts exist among these and other constituencies’ 
interests.  High returns for shareholders can mean low wages for 
workers.  Increased leverage may be good for shareholders but bad 
for bondholders.  Conflicts like these mean that those in charge 
must make trade-off judgments.  These choices are assumed to be 
zero-sum games. 
According to this view of the corporation, CSR requires 
management to balance shareholder and nonshareholder interests.  
Strict shareholder primacy—the idea that shareholder interests 
should enjoy priority over those of nonshareholders—is rejected 
because of the costs it can inflict on nonshareholders.  For example, 
profit maximization, even when pursued within the boundaries of 
the law, can lead to plant closings that harm workers and local 
communities, environmental damage, and human rights violations 
in developing countries.4  Socially responsible leadership therefore 
necessitates that management temper its pursuit of profit with 
regard for such considerations. 
The constituency model of CSR largely takes for granted the 
trade-off or zero-sum assumption that sees benefit to 
nonshareholders coming at the expense of shareholders.  Proponents 
must therefore rely on moral or ethical arguments, conceding the 
economic critique.  Thus, for example, so-called corporate law 
progressives justify the balancing approach to CSR on fairness 
 
 4. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 763 (2005). 
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grounds, arguing that nonshareholders should not be required to 
rely on their own contractual bargaining capabilities to protect their 
interests.5  Balancing has also been defended on efficiency grounds.6  
According to this view, management’s role is to mediate among the 
conflicting interests of the corporation’s various constituencies in 
order to encourage firm-specific investment and discourage 
opportunism.  For the most part, however, the constituency model of 
CSR—which has long been the standard way of thinking about 
CSR7—makes no effort to appeal to shareholder interests. 
B. Current Legal Status 
Corporate law endorses the constituency model of CSR, 
although only permissively.  As of 2003, forty-one states had enacted 
“constituency statutes” that authorize management to take into 
consideration a range of nonshareholder interests in addition to 
those of shareholders.8  Importantly, however, these statutes only 
permit balancing of interests rather than requiring it.  Corporate 
boards would thus be free to pursue CSR policies but cannot be 
sanctioned for choosing not to do so. 
Delaware—the state of incorporation for nearly two-thirds of 
U.S. publicly traded companies—has not enacted a constituency 
statute.9  Nevertheless, Delaware law is not committed to 
shareholder primacy.  Management’s duties are owed to “the 
corporation and its stockholders,”10 rather than to the shareholders 
alone.  Delaware courts have done little to explicate the meaning of 
this distinction but at least this formulation must indicate that the 
corporation is something other than—and presumably more than—
simply the shareholders alone.  It could, for example, be thought of 
as an entity existing separately from its shareholders and other 
stakeholders, or perhaps as an aggregation of its various 
constituencies. 
 
 5. See, e.g., David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: 
Foundation and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1 
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). 
 6. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 280–81 (1999). 
 7. See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1157 (1932) (arguing that management 
should have regard for the interests of workers and customers as well as those 
of shareholders). 
 8. For a description of some of these statutes, see Kathleen Hale, 
Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond Stakeholder Statutes, 45 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 823, 833 (2003).  For further discussion, see, for example, David Millon, 
Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A 
Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency 
Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992). 
 9. Hale, supra note 8, at 833. 
 10. See, e.g., Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del. Ch. 1938), aff’d sub 
nom. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). 
W08_MILLON 10/3/2011  7:09 AM 
2011] CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 527 
Although the Delaware Chancery Court has stated that 
directors are obligated “to attempt, within the law, to maximize the 
long-run interests of the corporation’s stockholders,”11 the Delaware 
courts have never stated plainly that management’s fiduciary 
responsibilities—the duties of care and loyalty—imply a general 
duty to maximize profits without regard to competing 
nonshareholder considerations.  Even the quoted language, with its 
reference to “long-run interests,” is vague enough to accommodate 
policies that favor nonshareholder interests as long as there may be 
some plausibly asserted long-run benefit to the shareholders.  In any 
event, such pronouncements are of no practical importance, because 
shareholders lack the ability to challenge management policies that 
favor nonshareholder interests even if the result is reduction of 
profits.  Under the business judgment rule, courts will not second-
guess decisions—including decisions that appear to benefit 
nonshareholders at the expense of shareholders—as long as 
management can assert some plausible connection with the 
corporation’s long-run best interests.12  Further, unless a 
complaining shareholder can show that the decision in question was 
not based on adequate information or was tainted by conflict of 
interest, they will defer to management’s claims about benefit to the 
corporation rather than insisting on production of evidence.13 
In the one situation in which the Delaware Supreme Court has 
directly addressed management’s authority to consider 
nonshareholder interests, the court has declined to endorse 
shareholder primacy.  Hostile takeover bids typically present a clear 
conflict between the interests of shareholders (in unrestricted access 
to takeover premia, which are typically of substantial value) and 
those of nonshareholders (in defeat of an offer that threatens their 
well-being, for example, due to major cost-cutting initiatives).   
Defining the circumstances under which a target company’s 
management can lawfully defend against a hostile bid, the court 
stated in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. that management can 
take into account “the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than 
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps 
even the community generally).”14  The court will require 
 
 11. Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986); see also 
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(stating that duties of directors “include acting to promote the value of the 
corporation for the benefit of its stockholders”). 
 12. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 221–23 (2d ed. 2009). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).  In 
a later case, the Delaware Supreme Court said that benefits for 
nonshareholders must be “rationally related” to shareholder interests.  Revlon, 
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 183 (Del. 1986) (“A 
board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its 
responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the 
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maximization of shareholder value only if management voluntarily 
chooses to abandon its own long-run business strategy by 
undertaking a transaction that will result either in change of 
corporate control or break-up of the corporate entity.15  Otherwise, 
management may resist a hostile bid that would threaten 
management’s plans for the corporation’s future, however attractive 
the bid might be to the corporation’s shareholders.16  Thus, the 
Delaware Supreme Court has refused to embrace shareholder 
primacy in the one context in which it might have mattered most.  
In short, although it is often assumed that corporate law mandates 
shareholder primacy,17 there is in fact very little doctrinal basis for 
such claims.18 
C. Current Practice 
Although not required to do so by law, management of U.S. 
corporations typically pursues short-term profit maximization as 
measured by quarter-to-quarter earnings.  The objective is 
enhancement of share price, which depends on a reliable stream of 
regular earnings; failure to meet earnings targets usually results in 
immediate share price decline.19  Because the constituency model of 
CSR envisions expenditures—in the form of cash outlays or foregone 
revenues—that are designed to benefit nonshareholders, such 
policies would mean lower net income and therefore would conflict 
with management’s emphasis on the currently accepted short-term 
conception of shareholder value.  In other words, current practice 
generally embraces shareholder primacy and rejects CSR. 
There are several explanations for current practice, which as 
 
stockholders.”).  Even so, this formulation is vague enough to provide 
substantial discretion.  For example, management might defend a decision to 
protect workers by reference to long-run goodwill considerations. 
 15. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del. 
1994). 
 16. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 
1989).  For discussion, see Lyman Johnson & David Millon, The Case Beyond 
Time, 45 BUS. LAW. 2105 (1990). 
 17. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 
419–21 (2002); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 17–19, 677–81 (1986); 
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the 
Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of 
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 23 (1991). 
 18. The well-known case of Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), 
appears to endorse shareholder primacy in strong terms but in fact this decision 
has had very little influence on corporate law.  For discussion, see Lynn A. 
Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163 
(2008). 
 19. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, 34 FIN. 
MGMT. 5, 8 (2005) (“CEOs and CFOs know that the capital markets will punish 
the entire firm if they miss analysts’ forecasts by as much as a penny.”). 
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explained above, is not required by law.  Today’s shareholders 
typically adopt a short-term perspective that manifests itself in a 
strong preference for immediate results measured in terms of 
current share price.20  Management thus finds itself under scrutiny 
to deliver results on a quarter-to-quarter basis and goes to great 
lengths to achieve accounting results that meet or exceed earnings 
targets.21  Certain institutional investors are especially likely to 
exert significant pressure on corporations to generate steady profit 
streams.  For example, in order to meet their own obligations to 
their beneficiaries, the California Public Employees Retirement 
System and other state pension funds must achieve annual returns 
on their investments of eight percent.22  In the face of such demands, 
patience is not an option. 
Management compensation also encourages concentration on 
current share price.  Stock and stock option grants are significant 
elements of senior officer compensation at most U.S. corporations.23  
The justification is alignment of shareholder and management 
interests in order to reduce agency costs.  The effect is to encourage 
a short-term focus on profits in order to boost the value of shares 
and options awarded to executives of the corporation. 
Social norms shape an environment in which management 
tends to understand its role in terms of maximization of current 
share prices.  Business schools, apparently misapprehending the 
law, preach this ethic at the expense of a richer, more complex 
conception of responsibility.24  Corporate lawyers charged with 
 
 20. See, e.g., THE ASPEN INST. BUS. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, OVERCOMING SHORT-
TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND 
BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 2 (2009); MATTEO TONELLO, THE CONFERENCE BD., 
REPORT NO. R-1386-06-RR, REVISITING STOCK MARKET SHORT-TERMISM (2006); 
CFA CTR. FOR FIN. MKT. INTEGRITY & BUS. ROUNDTABLE INST. FOR CORPORATE 
ETHICS, BREAKING THE SHORT-TERM CYCLE (2006).  For a thorough analysis of 
the short-termism phenomenon that draws on a broad range of economic, 
business, and legal literature, see Lynne Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial 
Crisis and Corporate Governance (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law, Research 
Paper No. 11-052, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1794190. 
 21. This practice is referred to as earnings management or managerial 
myopia.  See, e.g., Sanjeev Bhojraj & Robert Libby, Capital Market Pressure, 
Disclosure Frequency-Induced Earnings/Cash Flow Conflict, and Managerial 
Myopia, 80 ACCT. REV. 1 (2005); Daniel A. Cohen et al., Real and Accrual-Based 
Earnings Management in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes Oxley Periods, 83 ACCT. 
REV. 757 (2008); David Millon, Why is Corporate Management Obsessed with 
Quarterly Earnings and What Should be Done About It?, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
890, 897–900 (2002); Natalie Mizik, The Theory and Practice of Myopic 
Management, 47 J. MARKETING RES. 594 (2010). 
 22. Roger Lowenstein, The Next Crisis: Public Pension Funds, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 27, 2010, at MM9. 
 23.  See HERBERT KRAUS, EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTIONS & STOCK APPRECIATION 
RIGHTS 1–2 (1994). 
 24. See generally RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS: 
THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE 
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advising boards on their responsibilities typically take shareholder 
primacy for granted.25  The business press insists on the same 
idea,26 and prominent corporate law academics—most of whom tend 
to embrace a conservative law-and-economics agenda—likewise 
assume that shareholder primacy rather than CSR is legally 
mandated.27 
II.  THE SUSTAINABILITY MODEL OF CSR 
A. The Model 
The sustainability approach to CSR is based on the idea that 
the corporate entity should remain economically viable over the long 
run.  The corporation must generate profits because survival 
requires it, but survival most emphatically does not require short-
term profit maximization.  In fact, a short-term time horizon may 
impede the corporation’s long-run sustainability because it can 
result in policies that sacrifice future earnings for current net 
income. 
The connection between sustainability and CSR is simply the 
realization that the corporation’s long-run prosperity depends on the 
well-being of its various stakeholders, including workers, suppliers, 
and customers.  Sustainability also requires ongoing availability of 
natural resources and a natural environment in which the 
corporation and its various constituencies can survive and flourish.  
Well-functioning markets and stable and supportive governments 
are also essential.  Because the corporation itself has a significant 
role to play in determining the welfare of these stakeholders and in 
nurturing productive, reliable relations with them, a sustainability 
approach to business success has the potential to achieve many of 
the goals that CSR proponents advocate. 
The sustainability model of CSR differs from the constituency 
model sketched above in a fundamental way.  The constituency 
approach sees attention to nonshareholder interests as a cost that 
comes at the expense of profit and therefore of shareholder value.  
This is the trade-off or zero-sum assumption.  In contrast, the 
sustainability perspective sees attention to nonshareholders—
including investment in their well-being—as essential to the 
 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION (2007). 
 25. For a recent example, see Charles M. Nathan, A 12-Step Program to 
Truly Good Corporate Governance, THE HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REG. (May 18, 2011, 9:26 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011 
/05/18/a-12-step-program-to-truly-good-corporate-governance/ (asserting that 
the goal of corporate governance is to enhance shareholder value). 
 26. See, e.g., Aneel Karnani, The Case Against Corporate Social 
Responsibility, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424052748703338004575230112664504890.html. 
 27. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 18. 
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viability and success of the firm and therefore also to the 
enhancement of shareholder value.  The key difference is the 
relevant time horizon.  Constituency CSR emphasizes the negative 
impact of expenditures on nonshareholders on the corporation’s 
bottom line in the accounting period in which the costs are incurred.  
Sustainability CSR looks beyond the current quarter or year and 
factors in long-run benefit as a potential offset to short-term cost.  It 
therefore does not necessarily pose the threat to shareholders 
assumed by critics of constituency CSR and may actually be in their 
long-run best interests. 
B. Illustrations 
The sustainability approach to corporate management 
accommodates CSR expenditures because it takes into account long-
term payoffs that benefit the corporation and thereby its 
shareholders as well.  For transnational corporations doing business 
in developing countries, sustainability may require investment in 
community-level infrastructure development projects, technological 
innovation, education, and health care.  As these investments lead 
to greater productivity and better product quality, workers and 
producers can earn higher incomes, allowing the local population to 
enjoy a higher standard of living.  An example is Nestlé’s entry into 
milk production in the Moga district of India.28  Investments in 
refrigeration, well drilling, veterinary medicine, and training have 
vastly increased output; enhanced product quality has allowed 
Nestlé to pay higher prices to farmers.29  The result is higher 
incomes for farmers and their employees, and the region now has a 
significantly better standard of living compared to neighboring 
communities. 
In a similar vein, the Norwegian company Yara International 
ASA, the world’s largest chemical fertilizer company, has sponsored 
public/private partnerships to develop storage, transportation, and 
port facilities that will serve African regions with significant 
untapped agricultural potential.30  The objective is to facilitate 
increased yields through lower-cost access to markets, which allows 
entry into commercial farming.  This provides new jobs while also 
improving incomes and living standards for farmers.  At the same 
time, Yara benefits through increased demand for its fertilizer 
 
 28. See Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society: The Link 
Between Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 11, available at http://www.salesforcefoundation.org 
/files/HBR-CompetiveAdvAndCSR.pdf. 
 29. Id. 
 30. For Yara’s description of these initiatives, see Agricultural Growth 
Corridors and African Partnerships, YARA INTERNATIONAL ASA, 
http://www.yara.com/sustainability/africa_program/partnerships/index.aspx 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2011). 
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products.31 
By spending money on projects like these, corporations incur 
immediate costs that reduce current profits.  Longer-run benefits, 
however, have the potential to generate net gains in the form of 
enhanced productivity, greater skills and knowledge, commitment, 
increased consumer demand, political and social stability, and long-
run viability.  The corporation and its shareholders benefit—but so 
too do the local communities in which its workers and producers 
live.  In contrast, a narrow, short-term orientation seeks simply to 
locate production in developing countries in order to take advantage 
of low wages and lax regulations.  Current expenses are reduced, 
but long-run productivity and sustainability considerations are 
ignored. 
Closer to home, many U.S. companies have invested heavily in 
employee health through wellness and anti-smoking initiatives.32  
Such programs are expensive and therefore stand in contrast to 
short-term profit enhancement strategies based on minimizing 
wages and benefits.  Johnson & Johnson, for example, estimates 
that its Wellness & Prevention program has saved the company 
$250 million in employee health care costs over the past decade.33  
The savings represent a return of $2.71 on every dollar spent.34  
There also appears to be a connection between employer-sponsored 
wellness programs and employee loyalty; companies with effective 
programs experience significantly lower voluntary attrition.35  
Greater productivity and higher morale may also result.36 
Investment in research and development (“R&D”) is another 
example of an upfront cost with potential longer-term payoffs.  
Despite the crucial importance of R&D for corporate sustainability, 
corporations have been reducing expenditures in order to maintain 
short-term earnings.37  A reversal of this trend would be socially 
beneficial because it would facilitate the development of new 
products and services, including those that address consumer 
demand for environmentally responsible offerings.38  Proctor & 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Leonard L. Berry et al., What’s the Hard Return on Employee Wellness 
Programs?, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2010, at 104, 105. 
 33. Id. at 105. 
 34. Id; see also Rachel M. Henke et al., Recent Experience in Health 
Promotion at Johnson & Johnson: Lower Health Spending, Strong Return on 
Investment, 30 HEALTH AFF. 490 (2011). 
 35. Berry et al., supra note 32, at 106. 
 36. Id. at 112. 
 37. See, e.g., William R. Baber et al., The Effect of Concern About Reported 
Income on Discretionary Spending Decisions: The Case of Research and 
Development, 66 ACCT. REV. 818, 818 (1991) (finding significantly lower R&D 
spending where it would affect reported earnings). 
 38. Ram Nidumolu et al., Why Sustainability is Now the Key Driver of 
Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2009, at 57, 61–62. 
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Gamble’s development of cold-water clothes-washing detergents is 
one example.39  Toyota’s invention of hybrid gasoline/electric 
automobiles is another; the failure of U.S. automakers to make 
similar R&D investments has left them at a competitive 
disadvantage, forced to license Toyota’s technology.40  Similarly, GE 
has invested billions in order to develop its “ecomagination” line of 
energy efficient products and now predicts that revenues from these 
products will grow at twice the rate of total company revenues over 
the next five years.41  All of these are examples of products that will 
provide social benefits as well as profits to the corporation and its 
shareholders, but such results are only achieved if companies are 
willing to spend money on projects that will earn returns in the 
future, if at all. 
C. “Strategic” versus “Philanthropic” CSR 
The examples sketched above share a strategic emphasis on 
investments that serve the interests of key stakeholders in order to 
bolster the corporation’s long-term sustainability.  As a result, 
nonshareholder constituencies can benefit in important ways.  
However, because such policies are justified in economic terms—in 
terms of the corporation’s long-run profitability—there is no need to 
resort to moral or ethical arguments, as is the case with the 
constituency model of CSR.  The whole point is to generate net gains 
in the future from expenditures incurred in the present—benefits to 
nonshareholders come not at the expense of shareholders but rather 
are deployed for their ultimate advantage. 
For this reason, this approach to CSR objectives can be labeled 
“strategic.”42  In contrast, the notion that CSR requires firms to 
forego profits—and therefore reduce shareholder wealth—in order to 
spend corporate funds to benefit nonshareholder constituencies 
might be termed “philanthropic” CSR.  An example would be refusal 
to immediately close a plant generating subnormal returns because 
of concerns about the harsh impact the closure would have on the 
labor force, the local community, and perhaps also on the company’s 
reputation among consumers, investors, and the general public.  
Such a decision could be characterized as “philanthropic” in the 
sense that corporate management has chosen voluntarily to forego 
profits in order to benefit nonshareholder constituencies.  These 
benefits come at the expense of the shareholders.  From that 
 
 39. Id. at 62. 
 40. Porter & Kramer, supra note 28, at 88–89. 
 41. Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: How to 
Reinvent Capitalism—and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 62, 67.  For GE’s description of the 
“ecomagination” initiatives, see Ecomagination, GENERAL ELECTRIC, 
http://www.ecomagination.com/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2011). 
 42. See Porter & Kramer, supra note 28, at 88. 
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perspective, the decision is analogous to a charitable donation to a 
nonprofit organization. 
Typically no serious effort is made to defend philanthropic CSR 
in economic terms.  There may be assertions of long-run goodwill or 
reputational advantages but such claims are virtually impossible to 
document and the evidence of actual positive effects of CSR policies 
on worker, consumer, or investor attitudes is uncertain.43  Indeed, 
the key idea is not economic at all.  It is instead based on a claimed 
moral or ethical imperative requiring that corporations perform 
good works regardless of their possible negative impact on profits.  
This is why this notion of CSR has made only limited headway 
beyond left-leaning academics and political activists for whom the 
profit motive may be suspect at best and shareholders are to be 
tolerated but no more than that. 
Because sustainability CSR insists on corporate profitability 
over the long run, and benefits to key nonshareholder constituencies 
are designed ultimately to generate payoffs to the corporation and 
its shareholders, it need not rely on moral or ethical argument 
alone.  Instead, strategic CSR should be understood as promoting 
the corporation’s financial interest and therefore those of the 
shareholders too.  This approach avoids objections to the effect that 
management is “spending someone else’s money”44 when it uses 
corporate funds to improve the well-being of nonshareholder 
stakeholders.  For this reason, strategic CSR ought to have 
significantly broader appeal than the constituency or philanthropic 
model has had. 
While sustainability CSR has the potential to benefit 
nonshareholders substantially, it is important to note that it is not a 
complete solution to the problem of the social responsibilities of 
business.  Because it is driven by strategic business considerations, 
this approach to CSR includes built-in limitations on what 
corporations are likely to do.  Specifically, they cannot be expected to 
engage social issues unless they have the potential to improve the 
long-run bottom line.  Thus, for example, a corporation may decline 
to address environmental impacts or labor-force problems, even 
though doing so could serve the corporation’s business interests, if in 
management’s view the long-run benefits to the corporation do not 
justify the short-term costs. 
Further, pressure from shareholders for immediate returns is 
likely to skew the cost-benefit calculus.  Management’s awareness 
that shareholders prefer current earnings may lead it to discount 
the value of future payoffs more heavily than it otherwise would.  In 
other words, management may assume that a higher rate of return 
 
 43. Id. at 83. 
 44. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase 
Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 33, 33. 
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is necessary to justify current expenditures designed to benefit 
nonshareholders.  This would discourage some investments that 
might be endorsed if shareholders were more patient than they 
typically are today. 
Seen solely through a cost-benefit lens, CSR initiatives are not 
likely to go as far as some would advocate.  The moral or ethical case 
for, say, environmentally responsible policies, or attention to human 
rights issues, may therefore continue to provide justification for 
business policies that cannot be defended solely in economic terms.  
CSR may require attention to nonshareholder interests even when 
doing so is not in the long-run interests of the shareholders. 
Further, if CSR is limited solely to strategic considerations, 
corporations will not contribute to efforts to solve social problems 
that are unrelated to their long-run economic interests.  Purely 
charitable expenditures therefore would require justification on 
other grounds, and moral or ethical arguments for CSR would be 
relevant here too.  Large corporations make significant cash and 
noncash contributions to a range of educational, health, community 
development, environmental, and cultural organizations.  One 
survey found that the median total giving amount for sixty-one 
Fortune 100 companies exceeded $56 million in 2009.45  These gifts 
often have no direct connection to the donor’s business and are made 
for essentially philanthropic reasons.46  They provide needed 
financial support for worthy causes that otherwise might not receive 
sufficient funds to be effective.  Attractive as the argument for 
sustainability CSR may appear to be, a philanthropic conception of 
CSR, unmotivated by business considerations, therefore continues to 
be important in its own right.  Sustainability CSR is not a complete 
substitute. 
III.  THE PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINABILITY CSR 
The economic argument for sustainability CSR ought to have 
broad appeal.  Because it is not based on purely moral or ethical 
considerations, it avoids standard objections raised against the 
constituency CSR model based on the interests of shareholders and 
their claims of privilege vis-à-vis the corporation’s various 
nonshareholder groups.  Further, unless blinded by short-term 
myopia, corporate executives should appreciate the importance of 
the corporation’s long-run viability.  They therefore should be 
receptive to the idea that investment in the well-being of key 
stakeholders can generate significant financial returns.  Indeed, the 
examples sketched above—and there are many others that illustrate 
 
 45. COMM. ENCOURAGING CORP. PHILANTHROPY, GIVING IN NUMBERS 2010 
EDITION 7, available at http://www.corporatephilanthropy.org/pdfs/giving_in 
_numbers/GivinginNumbers2010.pdf. 
 46. Id. 
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the same idea47—indicate that many executives understand this 
point and are incorporating it into their business strategy.  Because 
these developments are driven by economic self-interest, there may 
be no need for law to encourage it further.  Even acknowledging, 
however, that acceptance of the sustainability model would not fully 
discharge a corporation’s social responsibilities, there are significant 
impediments to its widespread adoption as a basic element of 
corporate strategy. 
A. Sustainability CSR’s Problematic Appeal 
As discussed above, today’s shareholders—particularly the large 
institutions that increasingly dominate the stock markets—typically 
prefer immediate maximization of share value over a more patient 
approach that is willing to wait for potentially greater returns in the 
future.  This preference leads management to prioritize short-term 
profits over longer-run considerations.  This approach obviously 
discourages constituency CSR because, under this model, benefits to 
nonshareholders reduce short-term profits and therefore have a 
negative impact on current share price.  Management’s catering to 
shareholder preferences also impedes thinking about long-run 
objectives because the corporation’s future performance depends in 
part on expenditures that are made today.  The impact on short-
term earnings tends to overwhelm considerations based on future 
returns.  Accordingly, CSR policies based on a commitment to 
sustainable profits are also a casualty of the current obsession with 
short-termism embraced by shareholders and management. 
As explained above, management compensation practices that 
typically include stock and stock options also encourage a short-term 
focus.  So too do social norms that encourage concentration on 
quarterly earnings as the relevant metric by which management is 
to be evaluated.  As long as corporate executives prioritize short-
term results over long-run value, sustainability considerations will 
be of only secondary importance.  So too will be the idea that CSR 
policies can contribute importantly to a corporation’s long-run 
viability. 
Even if corporate management appreciates the importance of 
sustainability as a business strategy, it will not necessarily 
appreciate the potential strategic benefits of CSR policies.  
Initiatives that require significant investments in the well-being of 
nonshareholders may be suspect because of their perceived 
association with constituency CSR policies, which are assumed to 
come at the expense of corporate profits and not to benefit the 
corporation.  Among executives who assume that shareholder 
primacy is the relevant metric, there may therefore be a strong 
 
 47. See, e.g., Porter & Kramer, supra note 41; Porter & Kramer, supra note 
28. 
W08_MILLON 10/3/2011  7:09 AM 
2011] CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 537 
tendency to bridle even at CSR policies that are based on strategic, 
rather than philanthropic, motivations. 
B. Accounting Conventions 
Current accounting conventions generally do not express the 
future value of strategic investments in the well-being of 
nonshareholder constituencies.48  This does not explain why 
shareholders generally focus on current earnings without regard to 
longer-term considerations; as explained above, there are other 
reasons for that phenomenon.  Nor does it explain why corporate 
management remains focused primarily on short-term earnings.  
The point instead is that an investor who seeks information about 
the potential future payoffs of current expenditures that are 
designed to generate sustainable profits by promoting the interests 
of nonshareholders will find it difficult to obtain that information 
from the corporation’s financial disclosure.  Similarly, corporate 
executives who approve expenditures benefiting nonshareholders 
may be frustrated at their inability to express the future value of 
those expenditures in the corporation’s financial statements. 
According to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, 
expenditures designed to benefit nonshareholders so as to create 
future value typically must be reported as expenses that reduce net 
income in the accounting period in which they are paid.49  The fact 
that they are supposed to generate future profits potentially 
extending over many years is not reflected on the income statement 
or balance sheet—instead they are accounted for as current 
expenses just as are, say, rent or salary or interest payments.50  So, 
for example, a corporation that spends money training farmers in 
more productive, less environmentally damaging agricultural 
practices or encouraging its employees to pursue healthier life 
choices will have to account for those costs on its income statement 
when the expenditures are made, reducing net income by the 
amount of the expenditure, even though the goal is to produce value 
in the future.  Although these might better be thought of as 
investments rather than expenses, their value is not expressed on 
the balance sheet. 
Compare in this regard expenditures made to acquire fixed 
assets, that is, assets that are expected to contribute value to the 
corporation over a number of years.  The cost of these assets is 
allocated over their useful lives, rather than treated as an expense 
to be assigned entirely to the period in which they are purchased.51  
 
 48. See Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in the United States, U.S. 
GAAP, http://cpaclass.com/gaap/gaap-us-01a.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2011). 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See STANLEY SIEGEL & DAVID A. SEIGEL, ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURE: A GUIDE TO BASIC CONCEPTS 50–51 (1983). 
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The theory is that the cost of these assets should be accounted for 
over the entire period during which they generate value.52  Further, 
the value of fixed assets is included on the balance sheet, expressed 
in terms of historical cost.53 
For an investment community obsessed with quarterly 
earnings, these accounting conventions arguably fail to capture 
accurately the worth of the expenditures designed to produce 
sustainable future benefits.  They therefore overstate the 
expenditures’ cost to the corporation.  A thoughtful analyst could no 
doubt distinguish costs that generate immediate value—rent and 
wages, for example—from the kinds of expenditures that are 
designed to produce future value.  He or she could then discount the 
latter category of expense accordingly, thus reducing the impact on 
the corporation’s net income.  Instead, however, shareholders’ 
current focus on earnings—on the “bottom line”—without regard for 
whether the corporation’s expenses may create possible longer-term 
value amounts to an uncritical acceptance of the validity of current 
accounting conventions as the basis for valuation of a corporation’s 
stock.  Even if management wished to do so, it may be reluctant to 
correct, through its financial disclosure, misleading information 
based on these conventions.54 
CONCLUSION 
The orthodox model of CSR—which I have termed in this Article 
the “constituency” model—envisions the corporation as composed of 
a number of constituencies whose interests often conflict.  Policies 
that are designed to benefit a nonshareholder constituency are 
assumed to reduce profits and therefore affect shareholder interests 
adversely.  Similarly, strict adherence to profit maximization, while 
in the shareholders’ interest, can impose costs on nonshareholders.  
As management attempts to mediate among these conflicting 
interests, zero-sum trade-offs are assumed to be inevitable.  So, for 
example, faced with an underperforming plant, management must 
 
 52. See id.  Fixed assets include machinery, buildings, and vehicles. Id. at 
50.  The process by which the cost of such assets is allocated over their useful 
lives is termed “depreciation.”  Id.  A similar process is applied to assets that 
are actually consumed over time, such as oil reserves or timber, and is referred 
to as “depletion” rather than depreciation.  Id. at 50–51.  For certain intangible 
assets like patents, the allocation process is termed “amortization.”  Id. at 51. 
 53. See id. at 52. 
 54. In particular, concerns about uncertainty or materiality may discourage 
inclusion of forward-looking assertions in the Management’s Discussion and 
Analysis (“MD&A”) section of the corporation’s annual report.  See generally 
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decide whether to shut it down or continue operations for the sake of 
workers and the local community.  Seen in this light, CSR has 
enjoyed limited traction among business leaders, academics, 
lawyers, and policymakers because it is widely taken for granted 
that shareholder primacy is the relevant benchmark.55  In fact there 
is no legal warrant for that assumption, but its widespread 
acceptance renders the constituency model of CSR fundamentally 
problematic in the eyes of many. 
The “sustainability” model of CSR sketched in this Article 
rejects the zero-sum trade-off assumption of the constituency model 
and instead embraces the idea that the corporation’s long-run 
sustainability depends in part on the long-run viability of key 
stakeholders.  The corporation has a role to play in ensuring that 
viability.  Examples mentioned above include infrastructure 
investments in developing countries that will enhance the 
productivity of local farmers, benefiting the corporation as buyer of 
their produce and the farmers themselves and their local 
communities.  Many U.S. companies have spent significant sums on 
wellness and anti-smoking initiatives for their employees, resulting 
in a healthier workforce as well as improved loyalty and 
productivity.  The point is that investment in the well-being of key 
nonshareholder constituencies—even though costly in the short 
run—can generate payoffs in the future that justify those 
expenditures.  Indeed, failure to attend to such considerations may 
threaten the corporation’s long-run competitiveness.  Seen in this 
light, a commitment to sustainability has the potential to 
accomplish significant objectives favored by CSR proponents. 
The sustainability model of CSR avoids the standard objections 
to the constituency model based on shareholder primacy.  Long-run 
sustainability requires economic success over time.  Strategic 
investments beneficial to nonshareholders are thus designed 
ultimately to enhance profits.  The long-run perspective facilitates 
appreciation of the relevance of future returns on current 
investments and their potential to promote shareholder value. 
Conceived in this way, CSR grounded in sustainability concerns 
can produce real benefits for nonshareholders.  It is nevertheless 
important to bear in mind that it still may not do enough to satisfy 
fully the corporation’s responsibilities to society.  Because it is 
grounded on cost-benefit analysis, the arguably legitimate interests 
of nonshareholders will not be served unless, in the long run at 
least, the corporation will profit from current expenditures.  
Furthermore, an approach to CSR that is limited to the corporation’s 
strategic concerns will not justify philanthropy that cannot be firmly 
linked to the corporation’s own economic interests.  Accordingly, 
 
 55. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. 
L. 277, 277–78 (1998). 
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depending on one’s views about the extent of the business 
corporation’s social responsibilities, sustainability CSR may not go 
far enough. 
Even accepting these possible shortcomings, there is reason to 
doubt whether corporate self-interest can be sufficient to generate 
significant investment in CSR initiatives motivated by 
sustainability concerns.  The contemporary preference of most 
shareholders for current returns means that they are likely to be 
unreceptive to expenditures that reduce quarterly earnings for the 
sake of potential future payoffs.  In addition to possible questions of 
speculativeness, this impatience means that investors will discount 
heavily the value of any such future returns.  This will discourage 
potentially profitable CSR investments that might otherwise have 
been made. 
